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A PROHIBITION ON INCENTIVE TO REDEEM  
IN CAPITAL REGULATION
László Seregdi1
ABSTRACT
Pursuant to the Capital Requirement Regulation (CRR) of the EU, a capital in-
strument has to fulfil several conditions so that a credit institution can count it as 
a component in its own funds. Most of the conditions listed in the CRR are clear 
and well-defined, therefore their observance is easy to control. However, some 
conditions are not so unambiguous, e.g. the prohibition on incentive to redeem 
is particularly difficult to interpret. The condition above also appears among the 
requirements of Additional Tier 1 capital, Tier 2 capital and eligible liabilities. 
This study aims to present the economic logic of the prohibition on incentive to 
redeem, how the fulfilment of this condition can be checked and how regulatory 
authorities interpreted the fulfilment of the conditions regarding the prohibition 
on  incentive to redeem in specific cases. 
JEL codes: G21, K22, L51, N24, O16
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1 INTRODUCTION
In addition to the excessive leverage in the banking system and the lack of ap-
propriate liquidity buffers, the gradual deterioration of the volume and quality 
of own funds played an important role regarding the main reasons for the global 
financial crisis (BCBS, 2017). The Basel Committee contributed to this process, 
as well, as many of its guidelines resulted in the dilution of own funds (e.g. eli-
gibility of hybrid capital items under lax conditions, acceptance of short-term 
subordinated loans as the fulfilment of the capital requirement for market risk). 
Therefore, based on its experience gained during the global financial crisis, the 
Basel Committee strove to take measures to improve the volume and quality of 
own funds. 
1 László Seregdi, supervisory advisor at the Regulatory Department of the National Bank of Hun-
gary. E-mail: seregdil@mnb.hu.
economy and Finance • VoL. 7 iss. 3 • sept. 2020 • doi: 10.33908/eF.2020.3.6
a proHiBition on incentiVe to redeem in capitaL regULation 353
The quantitative measures primarily aimed to tighten the existing capital require-
ment rules (e.g. the minimum level of the CET1 ratio: 4.5%) and add new capital 
requirements (e.g. the introduction of capital buffer requirements).
The measures to improve the quality of capital focused on three main topics: the 
improvement of loss-absorbing capacity, the flexibility of payments and perma-
nence. For example, in accordance with a measure to improve loss-absorbing ca-
pacity, owing to the structure of minimum capital requirements, banks had to 
increase the ratio of Common Equity Tier 1 within the own funds and carry out 
most deductions from Common Equity Tier 1. The flexibility of payment is en-
sured by the fact that no minimum dividend payment obligation can be related to 
a Common Equity Tier 1 instrument. The bank shall always make a decision on 
the rate of dividend, depending on its actual prudential situation and successful-
ness. In the framework of permanence, the Basel III guidelines recognise only 
Common Equity Tier 1 and Additional Tier 1 capital without maturity date.
In order to ensure permanence, in addition to the components mentioned above, 
the Basel III guidelines also included a further additional requirement, which was 
adopted by the European Union in the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR2) 
later. This requirement was the prohibition on incentive to redeem related to the 
AT1 – Additional Tier 1 capital and the T2 – Tier 2 capital. Due to the amendments 
to the CRR made in 2019, the same requirement appears in relation to eligible 
liabilities (MREL – Minimum Requirements of Own Funds and Eligible Liabili-
ties), as well.
2  CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS  
AND THE OWN FUNDS, THE IMPORTANCE  
OF AT1 AND T2 CAPITAL ITEMS
The minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1) of credit institutions are set as a 
percentage of total risk exposure. Such requirements are complemented by the 
additional capital requirement (Pillar 2) determined by the supervisory author-
ity, the MREL requirement determined by the resolution authority, the combined 
capital buffer requirement prescribed by the law or the macroprudential author-
ity and the capital guidance set by the supervisory authority based on the results 
of stress tests. The credit institutions can fulfil the aforementioned requirements 
and expectations by CET1 – Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 capital, Tier 
2 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012
LászLó seregdi354
2 capital and eligible liabilities, which can only be considered if they comply with 
the numerous criteria specified in the CRR and the relevant Commission Tech-
nical Standards. A considerable part of the capital requirements can be fulfilled 
only by Common Equity Tier 1, therefore the availability of the appropriate vol-
ume of CET 1 is essential for the prudent operation of a bank. At the same time, 
legislation also allows the involvement of further capital items. Basically, CET 1 
equity instruments (e.g. common stock) and the reserves useable for covering 
losses (e.g. retained earnings, capital reserves) without restriction can be included 
in the CET 1. AT1 equity instruments are usually undated bonds which can be 
converted into CET 1 equity instruments in the event of a crisis or the arising 
loss may be written down directly from them. The T2 equity instruments usually 
include bonds the maturity of which exceeds five years and the buyer of the bond 
agrees to be the last preceding shareholders in priority in liquidation of the credit 
institution (subordinated liability). The eligible liabilities are loans taken out or 
bonds issued by the bank or deposits placed with the bank (except for deposits 
covered by deposit insurance) from which the loss may be written down in the 
event of a crisis.
Although the role of the AT1, T2 capital items and the MREL-eligible liabilities is 
not as important as that of the CET1, but several credit institutions use them on a 
complementary basis and they would not be able to fulfil the capital requirements 
without such items. Based on the above, it is important to examine whether these 
equity instruments and MREL-eligible liabilities3 comply with the provisions of 
the CRR on the prohibition on  incentive to redeem, because, otherwise, the eq-
uity instruments cannot be included in the own funds and the given liability will 
not be MREL-eligible and this may endanger the prudent operation of the institu-
tion. According to a recent survey conducted by the European Banking Authority 
(EBA), in 2019, more than 45% of the banks interviewed were planning to raise 
additional MREL-eligible liabilities. More than 20% of the banks were planning 
to involve additional Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 capital (EBA, 2019).
The detailed relationship between the capital requirements and the own funds is 
illustrated by Figure 1.
3 Due to the amendments to the CRR2, as of 28 June 2021, MREL-eligible liabilities will not be al-
lowed to contain any incentive to redeem component.
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Figure 1
Relationship between the capital requirements and the own funds instruments
Source: own design
Since the global financial crisis, financial regulators have been striving to increase 
the role of CET1 in every country. As a result, the requirements set by the Basel 
Committee and the European Union have changed into this direction, as well. 
Examining the year-end data of the Member States of the EU from 2017, it is ob-
servable that there were 16 Member States in which the percentage of CET1 ex-
ceeded 90% within the total amount of own funds. The percentage of CET1 was 
the lowest in the Netherlands and the UK, but it still reached 76% and 72% in these 
Member States respectively. The percentage of Additional Tier 1 exceeded 5% only 
in six countries, from which it was the highest in the UK with 11.48%. The role of 
Tier 2 capital was more significant, as its percentage within own funds exceeded 
10% in 11 countries. In this respect, the leader was also the UK with 16.29%. Figure 
2 shows the percentage of capital items CET1, AT1 and T2 within the own funds in 
the individual EU Member States.
As the figure indicates, on the whole, Hungary is in an average position the per-
centage of CET1 within the total amount of own funds is 89.41%, while the Ad-
ditional Tier 1 capital with a percentage of 0.09% is negligible and the percentage 
of Tier 2 capital (10.50%) is more significant.
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In the light of the above, on the one hand, regarding their rate, the AT1 and T2 
capital items seem to be less important in the EU and in Hungary than CET1, on 
the other hand, they complement the CET1 capital items effectively, as they have 
to comply with less stringent requirements. At the same time, they are still suit-
able for covering the arising losses in the event of a crisis.
Figure 2
The role of CET1, AT1 and T2 in the own funds  
in the EU Member States at the end of 2017
Source: EBA – Supervisory Disclosure
3 PROHIBITION ON INCENTIVE TO REDEEM
The CRR prohibits repurchase incentive under several names (reduction, call, 
redemption, reimbursement). For the sake of simplicity, hereinafter, we will uni-
formly use repurchase, as in an economic sense, the other names refer to more or 
less the same content, as well. The economic rationale behind the prohibition on 
incentive to redeem is that it infringes the requirement of permanence if, at the 
time of issue, the buyer of a given capital instrument received information based 
on which it may be assumed with reason that the originally undated or long-term 
capital instrument (e.g. bond) will actually have shorter maturity. This situation 
occurs if the conditions of the issue of the capital instrument encourage the issuer 
to repurchase the given instrument after a while. In possession of such informa-
tion, the investor does not plan to buy the capital instrument for a longer term, 
but only rather until the date when it is repurchased by the institution. In this 
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case, neither can the issuing institution expect the long-term availability of the 
capital instrument. 
A classic example for incentive to redeem is step-up, i.e. the gradual increase of 
the yield to be paid on the capital instrument. For example, if the yield of a subor-
dinated loan  with a maturity of 10 years starts increasing gradually for 5 years af-
ter the date of issue accompanied with a call option in the framework of which the 
institution has the right to repurchase the security belongs to the bond, the buyer 
of the bond may reasonably assume that the institution will have no choice but to 
repurchase the bond sooner or later, as it will become a more and more expensive 
source of funding for the institution. Applying a maturity of ten years instead of 
five years might be more advantageous for the issuer, as the total amount of the 
subordinated loan with a maturity of ten years can be offset in the own funds for 
five years after the date of issue, while in the case of a subordinated loan  with a 
maturity of less than five years, the amount that can be counted in the own funds 
is continuously decreasing.
The repurchase of the capital instrument is disadvantageous for the institution, 
because it reduces its own funds and there is a risk that the institution will not 
be able to fulfil the prudential requirements related to the own funds (e.g. risk-
weighted exposure ratio, leverage ratio and large exposure). 
The continuous increase in the interest payable on the instrument can also be 
considered as a continuous fine for the issuer, because, as a result, the fund from 
the instrument will be increasingly expensive. In view of the above, earlier, the 
participants used to interpret a call-back option related to the increase in the in-
terest as the actual maturity of the bond, as the call-back was bound to happen 
owing to the rising interest anyway. The lack of call-back used to be regarded as a 
fiduciary risk, as it suggested the investors that the issuer had funding problems 
(Corcuera et al., 2014). 
Based on the above, the CRR prohibits not only repurchase incentives belonging 
to own funds items, but it also lays down that the call-back, redemption, repay-
ment or repurchase of Additional Tier 1 capital instruments and the T2 capital 
instruments prior to their contractual maturity date shall be subject to strict con-
ditions and prior supervisory approval.
In the example above, repurchase incentive is obvious, therefore such a capital in-
strument cannot be counted in the own funds, as it fails to fulfil the requirement 
of permanence. However, based on practical experience, in many cases, it is not so 
easy to decide whether repurchase incentive occurs or not. Consequently, in our 
study, after a short summary of the regulatory background, we describe practical 
examples where more thorough analysis is needed to answer the question. 
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4 REGULATORY BACKGROUND
The CRR defines the prohibition on incentive to redeem in terms of the Addition-
al Tier 1 capital in the broadest sense and it is present in the following elements:
•	 the provisions applying to instruments shall not contain any incentives for the 
institution to redeem the instruments;
•	 the provisions applying to instruments shall not explicitly or implicitly refer 
to an actual or possible call, redemption or repurchase of the instruments, 
except in the following cases:
a) the liquidation of the institution;
b) the discretionary repurchase of the instruments or other discretionary 
methods for the reduction of Additional Tier 1 capital, provided that the 
institution has obtained prior authorization from the competent authority 
in accordance with Article 77 of the CRR;
•	 the institution shall not indicate explicitly or implicitly that the competent 
authority would consent to a request for the call, redemption or repurchase of 
the instruments.
Similar condition apply to Tier 2 capital and eligible liabilities, however, there are 
some minor derogations. 
In order to have standard detailed rules on  incentive to redeem and standard 
practical application of such rules in the whole EU, Article 20 of Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) No 241/2014 of 7 January 2014 supplementing Regula-
tion (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard 
to regulatory technical standards for Own Funds requirements for institutions 
detailed the conditions set forth in the CRR4.
According to the Commission Regulation, each feature that leads to expectations 
regarding the probable repurchase of the capital instrument at the date of issue 
shall be considered as a repurchase incentive. Such cases may be the following:
a)  A call option combined with an increase in the credit spread of the instrument 
if the call is not exercised.
The case above is the step-up, a classic example for repurchase incentive, when 
the issuer has the opportunity to repurchase the instrument after a fixed pe-
riod (in general, after five years). However, if the issuer does not exercise this 
right, the credit spread added to the reference rate will gradually increase. As 
4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HU/TXT/?qid=1563526193750&uri=CELEX:0201
4R0241-20150707.
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a result, the yield of the instrument will also increase, making the instrument 
more expensive for the issuing institution (see: the case described in point 3). 
In the Commission Regulation, credit spread is translated into Hungarian as 
“hitelkockázati felár”, which might be appropriate in certain contexts. At the 
same time, in this case, it is misleading, as it does not refer to the situation that 
the credit spread increases due to an increase in the issuer’s credit risk, but 
rather to the fact that the increase in the interest rate spread is already fixed 
at the moment of issue, irrespective of changes in the issuer’s credit quality (a 
similar problem arises in the case of point c), as well). 
b)  A call option combined with a requirement or an investor option to convert 
the instrument into a Common Equity Tier 1 instrument where the call is not 
exercised.
In this case, the issuer undertakes that after a specified period, if the issuer 
has not repurchased the instrument, the given bond shall be automatically 
converted to common equity or, at their own discretion, the investors shall be 
entitled to request the conversion of the bond to common equity (convertible 
bond). The aforementioned condition is considered to be a repurchase incen-
tive, as owners of the institution are usually not interested in the conversion of 
the instrument to common equity. This move would decrease their ownership 
share in the institution, as well as their management and control powers. Con-
sequently, the investors buying the instrument can be confident that the insti-
tution will repurchase the bond prior to its conversion into common equity. 
c)  A call option combined with a change in reference rate where the credit spread 
over the second reference rate is greater than the initial payment rate minus the 
swap rate.
In this case, after the specified period, the reference interest rate to which the 
yield of the instrument was linked changes (e.g. the yield payable in the first 
five years is LIBOR+2%, while later BUBOR+2.5%). The laws do not ban the 
change of the reference interest rate, but the expected effect of the change on 
the yield of the instrument should be examined. The Basel Committee illus-
trates the situation above with the following example: at the date of issue, the 
original reference rate is 0.9%, while the credit spread linked to the bond is 2% 
(as a result, the total yield paid for the first period is 2.9%). The current value of 
the reference rate applicable in the second period is 1.2%, therefore the credit 
spread promised for the second period cannot be higher than 1.7%, otherwise 
the yield would increase. In this case, the realisation of the repurchase incen-
tive can be examined only based on the reference yields at the date of issue, 
as there is no reliable data about how high the second reference yield will be 
in five years. 
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d) A call option combined with an increase of the redemption amount in the fu-
ture.
In this case, while the reference rate linked to the instrument and the credit 
spread remain unchanged, the amount for which the institution will be enti-
tled to repurchase the instrument will be continuously increasing after a spe-
cific period of time. For example, if the institution undertakes to repurchase 
the instrument after a period of five years, it could not repurchase it for 100% 
of the price, but rather for 102% in the 6th year, 104% in the 7th year, etc. In 
this case, the yield of the instrument seems to be unchanged, but the costs of 
repurchase are continuously rising. The condition mentioned above can occur 
in particular in the case of undated instruments.
e) A remarketing option combined with an increase in the credit spread of the 
instrument or a change in reference rate where the credit spread over the sec-
ond reference rate is greater than the initial payment rate minus the swap rate 
where the instrument is not remarketed.
The aforementioned case is essentially the same as the one mentioned in point 
c), with the difference that it is not linked to a call option, but the redistribu-
tion of the instrument instead.
f) A marketing of the instrument in a way which suggests to investors that the 
instrument will be called.
Even the CRR itself includes a condition according to which the provisions 
applying to instruments shall not explicitly or implicitly refer to the actual 
or possible call, redemption or repurchase of the instruments. For example, 
such a reference might be the following in the institution’s prospectus:  the 
institution plans to reinvest most of its profit into its own operation in the next 
five years, therefore the capital adequacy of the institution would become so 
strong that the institution would not need the Additional Tier 1 capital from 
the issued instrument, therefore it would probably repurchase it.
If the supervisory authority realises that either of the cases occurs as regards ei-
ther the AT1, or the T2 equity instrument, it shall ban the issuing credit insti-
tution from taking into account the given instrument in its own funds. Credit 
institutions which are planning to issue such an  instrument should consult the 
supervisory authority about whether the given bond fulfils all conditions set forth 
in the CRR already prior to the issue, because it is very difficult to amend the 
conditions afterwards.
It is important to mention another rule of the CRR, according to which CET1 
equity instruments can be reduced, redeemed or repurchased, AT1 and T2 eq-
uity instruments and MREL-eligible liabilities can be called, redeemed, repaid 
or repurchased only if certain strict conditions are fulfilled and with the prior 
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authorisation of the supervisory authority. In the light of the above, if an institu-
tion wants to repurchase a given  instrument due to the rising cost of the fund, 
it cannot do so unless the circumstances fulfil the conditions or the supervisory 
authority does not provide its authorisation. Articles 77-78 of the CRR contain 
the rules of supervisory approval and the conditions of the possible reduction of 
own funds.
The draft of the Commission Regulation on the detailed rules of incentive to re-
deem was elaborated by the EBA. During the consultation about the draft of the 
Commission Regulation, market participants indicated that it could be practical 
to authorise the EBA to establish further cases of repurchase incentive or indicate 
in the RTS if the list is not extensive. In its response to the aforementioned ques-
tion, the EBA pointed out that it did not want to receive such authorisation and, 
according to its current knowledge of the market, the list was extensive (EBA, 
2013). Interestingly, it contradicts to the position of the Basel Committee, which 
also provided a list of the cases of repurchase incentive. At the same time, the 
latter body clearly emphasised that the list they provided was not extensive and 
repurchase incentive could have other forms, as well (BCBS, 2017). In the same 
document, the Basel Committee also established that the fact itself according to 
which an instrument will have variable interest rates instead of fixed interest rates 
after a certain period, while the risk premium compared to the reference interest 
rate remains unchanged, does not necessarily mean that the fact of repurchase in-
centive exists. However, supervisory authorities should examine such cases with 
particular care.
Another important criticism of the draft of the Commission Regulation stated 
that the definition of repurchase incentive components was too general, leav-
ing supervisory authorities scope for interpreting them according to their own 
viewpoint, thus creating considerable uncertainty in the market. In the course of 
creating the draft of the regulation, the EBA ignored this opinion, as well, since 
the supervisory authorities concerned always have the above-mentioned scope of 
powers.
5 PRACTICAL EXAMPLES
It is not always easy to decide whether, in relation to a specific capital item repur-
chase incentive occurs or not. In the examples below, we demonstrate how the 
competent authorities evaluated individual cases.
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a) In its Answer No. 2016_29885, the EBA examined a case in which a bank issued 
a hybrid equity item that had a fixed-interest rate in the first period, and then had 
a floating rate coupon after the first period. After the first period, the issuer had 
the opportunity to redeem the instrument. In the case of both the fixed and the 
variable interest rate, the interest rate spread applied remained unchanged. At the 
same time, one of the conditions prescribed that the variable interest rate could 
not be lower than the fixed interest rate. In its overall evaluation of the conditions 
above, the EBA established that the given instrument included repurchase incen-
tive, because the interest paid in the second period is the same or will be higher 
that the fixed interest paid in the first period.
b) In its Answer No. 2016_28486, the EBA examined the case when an institution 
issued a new instrument with exactly the same conditions as the ones of a previ-
ously issued equity instrument (tap issuance). The question was whether it was 
a case of incentive to redeem if the credit spread applied when issuing the new 
instrument was lower than the spread applied at the time of issue of the original 
instrument. The question was raised because the original interest rate and the 
new interest rate condition applied after the first period in the case of the newly 
issued instrument will be the same. However, due to the lower credit spread, the 
case of the second issue, the difference between the interest rates used at the time 
of issue and after the change of the interest rate will be greater. First, in its Answer, 
the EBA pointed out that when applying the CRR, all similar cases of tap issu-
ance should be considered a new issuance, therefore the question can be raised 
only when, in the case of the original issue, the interest rate is changed and the 
repurchase right is granted after more than five year. Even in the case of tap is-
suance, the first call date has to be a minimum five years after the date of the tap. 
If, in the event of tap issuance, all other conditions agree, but the risk premium 
is lower, owing to the resulting higher interest spread, the tap issuance contains 
an  incentive to redeem element, therefore the  instrument cannot be taken into 
account  in the own funds. 
c) In its Answers in connection with the interpretation of Basel III, the Basel 
Committee examined the question how it should be judged when, following the 
first call option, the bank takes over the amount of the withholding tax to be 
paid by the bond owners on the interest received (i.e. the yield paid on the bond 
increases, however, the interest rate included in the conditions of the bond re-
mains unchanged). In the view of the Committee, it should also be considered as 
5 https://eba.europa.eu/single-rule-book-qa/-/qna/view/publicId/2016_2988.
6 https://eba.europa.eu/single-rule-book-qa/-/qna/view/publicId/2016_2848.
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step-up, i.e. a repurchase incentive, therefore, such a bond cannot be considered 
as Additional Tier 1 capital (BCBS, 2017).
d) The Answers of the Basel Committee to the questions related to repurchase 
also include the following: if a bank intends to repurchase one of its  instruments 
issued earlier and replace it by a new instrument that has higher credit spread, the 
supervisory authority shall not approve of the repurchase. Namely, it will raise 
market expectations based on which the bank will repurchase all other instru-
ments of lower yields soon (BCBS, 2017).
e) The Basel Committee also expressed that the fact itself that an instrument al-
lows the institution to repurchase the instrument several times following the ini-
tial five-year period does not involve incentive to redeem. In the light of the above, 
if it does not contain any other incentive to redeem component, it can be taken 
into account in the own funds (BCBS, 2017).
6 AT1 TEMPLATE
In order to standardise and make comparable the issuances of Additional Tier 1 
capital instruments in the European Union and make sure that they contain all 
conditions allowing the instrument to be taken into account  in the own funds, 
in October 2016, the EBA published a document that provided a model-contract 
template for such issuances (EBA, 2016). 
This template includes several provisions of the CRR on prohibiting incentive to 
redeem. Based on the EBA’s experience, if an institution intends to exercise its 
right of repurchase within five years after the issue of the instrument, it will re-
purchase the entire portfolio of the given equity instrument. The contract tem-
plate contains this provision, but as it is not forbidden by the law, the EBA men-
tions as a possible condition that the institution shall repurchase only a part of the 
portfolio of the given instrument.
The contract template refers to Articles 77-78 of the CRR to make it clear for inves-
tors that, in spite of the fact that the conditions of the bond allow the issuer to re-
purchase the instrument, it can only be repurchased if the conditions mentioned 
in Article 78 are fulfilled (the institution shall replace the  instrument by capital 
of at least the same good quality or it is able to meet prudential requirements even 
after the repurchase of the given  instrument) and the supervisory authority has 
approved of the repurchase.
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7 CONCLUSION
The CRR lays down several conditions of regarding taking into account an in-
strument in the own funds. The numerous conditions in the CRR include a pro-
hibition on incentive to redeem, whose judgement is controversial in many cases. 
Although the laws list the possible cases of incentive to redeem, the evaluation 
of certain special cases may require interpretation by the supervisory authority. 
Based on the above, market participants should be familiar with the relevant leg-
islation and interpretation of the law, because even a seemingly completely ap-
propriate instrument may fail during a detailed regulatory investigation if the 
condition of prohibiting  incentive to redeem is not fulfilled. 
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